When the algorithm determines wages

Study involving TU Darmstadt highlights risks for digital labour markets

2026/08/21

What happens when companies on digital labour platforms no longer decide for themselves how much to pay their workers, but leave this to learning algorithms? Researchers at TU Darmstadt, Bielefeld University and the Université Côte d’Azur have demonstrated in computer simulations that, where only a few firms compete with one another, such artificial intelligence (AI) systems can ‘learn’ to set wages at a very low level without communicating with one another or having been programmed to collude. The findings have now been published in the journal ‘Labour Economics’.

Researchers working with Professor Michael Neugart from the Public Finance and Economic Policy Group within the Department of Law and Economics at TU Darmstadt investigated digital work platforms such as ‘Amazon Mechanical Turk’. Such platforms act as intermediaries for work and services, for example in the fields of software development, multimedia, translation, data entry or marketing.

In Germany, crowdworking – a form of work in which companies award contracts to external workers via digital platforms – is not yet a widespread phenomenon. It is primarily used as a source of supplementary income. At the same time, its use has increased significantly in recent years: according to a survey by the Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW), around 8.2 per cent of companies in the German information industry were using crowdworking in 2020.

In the model, companies leave the decision on the wages offered to so-called deep Q-networks (DQN). These are self-learning algorithms trained using reinforcement learning. They utilise neural networks that can recognise complex relationships based on data and derive decisions from them.

For their study, the researchers combined economic modelling with machine learning methods and extensive computer simulations. The central question was whether the algorithms could independently learn to set wages below the level that would result from normal competition between companies.

Low wages without any explicit agreement

The simulations showed that, under certain conditions, self-learning algorithms can produce wages that are significantly below the competitive level. If only a few firms are competing with one another, wages may approach a level that would result from collusion between the firms – that is, an agreement that restricts competition.

Professor Michael Neugart
Professor Michael Neugart

The study thus addresses a new field of research: so-called algorithmic collusion. Previous studies have focused primarily on product markets and the question of whether algorithms can learn inflated, collusion-like prices. This study applies this line of inquiry to labour markets and, in particular, to digital labour platforms.

The study also differs methodologically from much earlier work. Whilst these used simpler forms of reinforcement learning, the researchers employ a more powerful method: deep Q-networks.

Relevant to the regulation of AI

The findings are relevant, amongst other things, to labour market and competition policy, as well as to the regulation of platforms and AI systems. With the increasing automation of economic decisions, the question arises as to how markets function when algorithms independently set wages, prices or other contractual terms.

“The study highlights a problem that could become increasingly significant as economic decisions become more automated: companies may not even need to collude explicitly on wages or prices,” says the study’s author, Neugart. “Under certain conditions, machine-learning algorithms can independently develop behaviours whose market outcomes resemble such collusion.”

It could therefore be important for competition authorities to gain a better understanding of which characteristics of modern machine-learning algorithms favour non-competitive market outcomes. The study does not relate solely to digital labour platforms. Fundamentally, the question arises wherever algorithms make autonomous economic decisions regarding prices, wages or contractual terms.

The publication

Herbert Dawid, Philipp Harting, Michael Neugart: Algorithmic wage setting on online labor platforms, in: Labour Economics, Volume 102, October 2026, 102945

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